From Potsdam to the Indo-Pacific: Spheres of Influence and the Return of Great Power Diplomacy
Are There Still Small States at the Table? Power, Order, and the New Geometry of Influence
March 22nd, 2026
Berlin Global’s Sunday Article – In the summer of 1945, amid the physical and moral ruins of Europe, the leaders of the victorious Allied powers convened in the quiet surroundings of Cecilienhof in Potsdam. The contrast between the tranquillity of the setting and the magnitude of the decisions to be taken could scarcely have been more pronounced. The Potsdam Conference would not merely conclude a war; it would shape the political architecture of the post-war world. Potsdam demonstrates that the architecture of international order is often determined by the most powerful, with smaller states having little agency.
The Logic of Potsdam – Power Shapes Order
At Potsdam, Harry S. Truman, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill later replaced by Clement Attlee faced a question as old as diplomacy itself: how is power to be organised after the collapse of an international order? Their answer was neither purely legal nor overtly ideological. It was, rather, grounded in the realities of force, security, and strategic necessity.
Germany was divided into zones of occupation; Eastern Europe fell, in practice, within the Soviet sphere of influence. These arrangements were not always codified in formal language, yet they were widely understood. As John Lewis Gaddis observed in The Cold War, “the post-war settlement rested less on agreed principles than on the realities of power.” In a similar vein, Anne Applebaum has written in Iron Curtain that “the division of Europe was not only imposed by force, but negotiated, anticipated, and in some cases accepted.” Potsdam thus emerges not merely as a diplomatic conference, but as an exercise in delineating influence, establishing limits, and, where necessary, acknowledging them. The essential lesson is that power, not law alone, often dictates outcomes in international relations.
Spheres of Influence: Then and Now – Power Remains Central
For a time, the language of spheres of influence receded from diplomatic discourse, replaced by the vocabulary of international law and institutional order. Yet such concepts were never entirely abandoned. They remained embedded beneath the surface of international relations, re-emerging whenever the balance of power shifted or the authority of institutions weakened. Even in a rules-based system, great powers continue to carve out zones of influence, showing that spheres of influence are not merely historical, but a recurring feature of global politics.
In the present day, this re-emergence is particularly evident in the Indo-Pacific. The evolving relationship between the United States and China reflects not only a contest of economic and military capabilities but also a deeper question concerning the structure of regional order. Issues such as Taiwan, maritime claims in the South China Sea, and the formation of strategic alliances point towards a pattern that would not have been unfamiliar to the architects of 1945.
Graham Allison, in Destined for War, cautions that “when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, the most dangerous outcome is not conflict alone, but miscalculation about intentions and limits.” The observation underscores the enduring difficulty of managing transitions in power, particularly when the boundaries of influence are neither clearly defined nor mutually accepted.
The Position of Smaller States – Inclusion Without Influence
What distinguishes the present moment from that of 1945 is not the absence of smaller states, but the ambiguity of their position. At Potsdam, their exclusion was explicit; decisions affecting millions were taken without their direct participation. Today, smaller states are formally present within international institutions and regional frameworks, yet their capacity to shape outcomes remains uneven. While smaller states today participate formally in institutions, their real power is constrained by economic dependence and strategic pressures, echoing the marginalisation of smaller European states at Potsdam.
Economic dependence, security arrangements, and political alignment all serve to constrain as much as they enable. Reflecting on the earlier period, Tony Judt remarked in Postwar that “for many Europeans, the end of the war did not mean freedom to choose, but the necessity of accepting choices made elsewhere.” The continuity of this dynamic, albeit in altered form, remains a defining feature of contemporary geopolitics.
Law, Order, and the Return of Power Politics – Rules Matter, But Only If Respected
The post-war international system sought to move beyond the logic of Potsdam by embedding power within legal and institutional frameworks. The establishment of the United Nations and the development of international law represented an effort to constrain unilateral action and to provide smaller states with a degree of protection against the arbitrary exercise of power.
Yet these frameworks depend fundamentally upon the willingness of powerful states to uphold them. As Henry Kissinger observed in World Order, “no truly global ‘world order’ has ever existed… what passes for order is the reflection of a balance of power.” In the Indo-Pacific, legal norms coexist with strategic realities that frequently override them, as military presence, economic leverage, and diplomatic alignment continue to shape outcomes. The lesson is clear: institutions and law can moderate great power action, but only if the powerful choose to respect them.
From Potsdam to the Indo-Pacific – History Repeats with Variation
The comparison between Potsdam and the present is not exact, yet it is instructive. The contemporary international system is more interconnected and institutionally developed than that of 1945. Nevertheless, the structural question remains strikingly similar: how are competing centres of power to coexist, and on what terms?
The legacy of the Potsdam Conference lies not only in the arrangements it produced, but in the method it exemplified. Order constructed primarily through the accommodation of great powers may achieve stability, but it does so at the risk of marginalising those not present at the table. Such arrangements require continual adjustment if they are to retain legitimacy. The contemporary lesson is that history can guide us in balancing influence with fairness, but only if we recognise its patterns.
Cultural Diplomacy and the Memory of Order – Learning from the Past
The historical memory of Potsdam extends beyond diplomatic archives into the realm of cultural diplomacy. The site itself, preserved and interpreted, serves as a reminder that international order is shaped in particular places by identifiable actors confronting immediate pressures. Engaging international audiences with this history underscores how past decisions continue to influence present realities.
Such encounters highlight that diplomacy is not conducted solely through negotiations and treaties, but also through the transmission of historical experience and shared reflection. The legacy of Potsdam illustrates how cultural memory can illuminate enduring questions concerning authority, legitimacy, and the limits of power. Understanding history can caution great powers and encourage restraint in the exercise of influence.
The Return of an Old Question – Who Really Decides?
The Potsdam Conference reminds us that international order has often been shaped by a small number of powerful actors making decisions with global consequences. As great power competition intensifies, elements of that model appear to be returning, albeit in more complex and less formalised forms.
The central question for the present is therefore not only how power is distributed, but how it is constrained. If Potsdam represents the logic of power, the challenge of the contemporary international system lies in reconciling that logic with the principles of sovereignty, law, and inclusion.
From Potsdam to the Indo-Pacific, the issue endures with undiminished relevance: in an age of renewed great power diplomacy, who, in practice, has a seat at the table and who does not?
